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1 Introduction
The Monsanto Smallholder Programme (SHP) was an
initiative undertaken by the transnational
biotechnology, chemicals and seeds company,
Monsanto, between 1999 and 2002. The SHP had
the stated purpose of providing ‘resource-poor’,
‘smallholder’ farmers with a package of agricultural
extension services, including technical advice,
chemicals, improved seeds and genetically modified
(GM) traits, as well as other forms of support.
This article uses the case of the SHP to focus
specifically on the issues of farmer participation,
responsiveness and accountability, in a situation
where extension services were being supplied by a
transnational company that is also a major producer
and marketer of herbicides as well as the dominant
driver behind the development and
commercialisation of GM crops internationally. The
article explores how the SHP was conceived,
designed and implemented, discusses how far it was
designed around and responded to farmers’ needs
and priorities, and considers the extent to which
farmers were able to hold the company to account.
2 Farmer participation in agricultural research
and extension
More than two decades ago, some social scientists
and development practitioners began to call for new
approaches to agricultural research and extension
that would involve greater participation by farmers
and be more responsive to their needs and priorities.
In 1989, the landmark book Farmer First was
published, based on the presentations and discussions
from a workshop that took place at the Institute of
Development Studies (IDS) in 1987 (Chambers et al.
1989). The book articulated a critique of the
prevailing models of agricultural research and
extension and documented a number of cases in
which a new, participatory style of engagement with
farmers had begun to emerge during the late 1970s
and early 1980s.
A few years after Farmer First was published, Beyond
Farmer First (Scoones and Thompson 1994) reaffirmed
and also extended and developed the farmer first
framework, focusing on the power structures that
characterised the knowledge systems and
institutional contexts in which agricultural research
and extension was carried out. Farmer First and
Beyond Farmer First were, of course, interjections in a
much wider stream of discussion and debate. They
described, evaluated and critiqued a range of the
different approaches that had begun to be
experimented with, applied and documented; these
included Agro-Ecosystem Analysis, Farming Systems
Research and Extension, Farmer Participatory
Research, Rapid and Participatory Rural Appraisal
(RRA and PRA), Participatory Action Research and
Participatory Technology Development.
Since the early 1990s, a great deal of further
experimentation, experience, reflection and debate
has occurred. Unsurprisingly, the positions associated
with the farmer first school – notably RRA and PRA
– have themselves been challenged and criticised,
which has prompted further restatements,
adjustments and evolutions such as Participatory
Learning and Action (Buhler et al. 2002). And the
approach associated with farmer first is not the only
game in town, by any means. Another important
strand of conceptual development and practical
experience has occurred, in a rather separate
current, around the Farmer Field School approach
(FFS). FFS first emerged in 1989, originally
conceived as an educational tool for promoting
integrated pest management (IPM) and further
developed and promoted by the UN’s Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) since then (Braun
et al. 2006).
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It is not the purpose of this article to compare and
assess the strengths and weaknesses of these
different approaches. The important observation is to
note that the concept of farmer participatory
research, combined with an approach to agricultural
extension that is designed to be more responsive to
the needs and priorities of small farmers, has helped
to transform the policy debate about how best to
organise these services over a period of at least
20 years. Here, drawing particularly on the
arguments made by contributors to Farmer First and
Beyond Farmer First, is presented a brief summary to
illustrate the major criticisms that were being made
by the critics of traditional approaches to agricultural
research and extension. This overview is necessarily
selective, but it gives a flavour of the shortcomings
of conventional approaches, that had been identified
and were increasingly widely recognised as long ago
as the late 1980s.
The traditional approaches which drew the attention
of critics were epitomised by the training and visit
(T&V) system, which was developed and promoted by
the World Bank from the early 1970s. The T&V
system was designed in response to the felt need for
agricultural extension systems to promote the more
rapid diffusion of modern farming technology in order
to improve the productivity of agriculture in the
developing world. The system had a number of key
features. It deployed cadres of relatively low-skilled
agents to work with a fixed list of ‘contact farmers’
(later, more commonly, contact groups) at village level.
The work of the village-level extension agents was
closely supervised by technical specialists and
organised according to a fixed schedule of activities,
often on a fortnightly timetable. The T&V system
concentrated on conveying a number of simple
messages and technologies and focused on a short list
of the crops that were considered to be the most
important (Anderson et al. 2006; Bauer et al. 1998;
Buhler et al. 2002).
These basic elements of the T&V system epitomised
a ‘transfer of technology’ (TOT) mode of agricultural
research and extension. Critics argued that this kind
of approach, which had taken shape in industrial
countries and served relatively well in areas that
benefited from irrigation, market infrastructure and
institutional backing, was inappropriate for the
‘complex, diverse and risk-prone’ agriculture
practised by poor farmers in marginal and rain-fed
areas in developing countries. Contributors to Farmer
First and Beyond Farmer First argued that the TOT
mode reflected a simplistic, top-down, linear model
of technology diffusion, driven by ‘technology push’
rather than ‘demand pull’. In this linear model,
research agendas and priorities were set by
scientists, using the categories and classifications that
made sense to outsiders, rather than the situated
and contextual knowledge of farmers. The TOT
approach led to the promotion of standardised
‘packages of practices’ which were assumed to be
applicable across a range of agro-economic contexts
and expected to be promoted in a uniform manner
across a wide area.
In practice, this kind of approach often failed to
produce lasting change or bring benefits for farmers.
Experts would puzzle over the reasons for this,
exasperated by the failure of farmers to adopt the
new technologies or to apply them properly.
Attention was focused on particular lacks, such as
the technical ‘constraints’ that supposedly inhibited
small farm production and the ‘yield gaps’ that were
assessed as the lag between the level of productivity
achieved on agricultural research stations and the
lower yields achieved on small farms (the gap
between ‘actual productivity’ and some idealised
‘potential productivity’). This kind of thinking was
characterised as an approach that aimed to ‘change
farmers’ or ‘change farms’. Instead of that approach,
the advocates of participation emphasised the
importance of examining the social dynamics of
knowledge and technology production and called for
greater recognition and respect for poor farmers’
own capacity to experiment and innovate.
Participation advocates contrasted the TOT model’s
fixed menu of rigid precepts with a participatory
approach that would generate and make available an
à la carte basket of options from which farmers could
choose and flexible principles which would help
them make their choice. They proposed a farmer-
centred approach that would empower farmers to
work in collaboration with scientists to define
problems and develop appropriate solutions. This kind
of model called for a new, more humble and
facilitative role for outsiders.
Notwithstanding this wealth of insights into the
weaknesses of the TOT mode of agricultural research
and extension, the T&V system survived into the late
1990s, primarily because of the institutional and
financial backing of the World Bank (Bauer et al.
Glover Farmer Participation in Private Sector Agricultural Extension62
1998; Buhler et al. 2002; Anderson et al. 2006).
However, given its inappropriate premises and flawed
assumptions, it is not surprising that it was eventually
abandoned. Nevertheless, as the next section shows,
the TOT approach to agricultural research and
extension – technology-focused, expert-driven and
top-down – survives in the private sector.
3 The private sector in agricultural research and
extension
The role of the private sector has attained a new
prominence in policy debates about international
development in recent years (Sayer 2005). For their
part, as C.K. Prahalad (2005) has recently
documented, many large companies are gearing up
to exploit the commercial potential in undeveloped,
especially rural, markets in the global South. These
zones represent a vast new frontier for business
expansion and new entrepreneurship in a globalising
economy.
This is as true of the agriculture sector as for any
other. In search of affordable and effective ways to
inject new energy and dynamism into agricultural
extension services, various countries have explored
policy options including privatisation, greater
involvement of private sector service providers, and
various models of cost-recovery or fee-charging; India
and Pakistan are two examples (Sulaiman and
Sadamate 2000; Sulaiman and Hall 2002; Anderson
and Feder 2003; Davidson and Ahmad 2003; Shingi
et al. 2004). As with the former T&V approach, the
World Bank is a key driver of the privatisation agenda
(Davidson and Ahmad 2003). In India, a number of
agribusiness companies are beginning to explore the
market in this area, for example Mahindra and
Mahindra’s SubhLabh Services enterprise (Sulaiman
and Hall 2004).1 But many agricultural input
manufacturers and suppliers also claim to offer
agricultural extension advice and support alongside
the products they sell. However, as staff privately
acknowledge, this advice is inflected towards their
self-interest in marketing their own brands.
The increased profile of companies as partners in the
delivery of development goals reflects embedded
neoliberal trends in policy discourse, within national
politics in many countries as well as international
development circles. This perspective generally
conceptualises the role of the state in terms of the
delivery of services, and entails an openness to such
policy measures as the privatisation of public service
agencies, delivery of services through public–private
partnerships and fostering competition among
service providers. More tellingly, it entails
reconfiguring the identity of citizens as ‘citizen-
consumers’, in line with a neoliberal worldview
(Clarke 2004).2
To some extent, private commercial provision of
agricultural advice and services implies a degree of
responsiveness and accountability on the part of the
suppliers towards the customers. However, small and
poor farmers are unlikely to exert a strong influence.
This implies a limited empowerment of poor rural
people to be ‘users and choosers’ but not necessarily
‘makers and shapers’ of the goods and services they
receive – able to exercise a limited kind of
accountability through the market but not much
more than that (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001).
However, in the case of the Monsanto Smallholder
Programme, we see an example of a situation in
which a large transnational company geared up a
programme specifically targeted towards the small
farmer segment of the market. The next section
explores how this came about.
4 Monsanto and smallholder farmers
When Robert Shapiro was appointed as Monsanto’s
new chief executive officer (CEO) in April 1995, he
embarked on a programme to re-orient the
company’s business around ‘sustainability’. He linked
the urgent need to grow enough food to feed a
growing population and the ecological harm that
would be entailed in trying to do so with existing
technologies and agricultural practices (Scott 1996;
Lenzner and Upbin 1997; Magretta 1997; Shapiro
1998; Shapiro 1999). This conceptualisation of the
sustainability challenge implicitly involved the farmers
and consumers of the developing world as key
stakeholders and important players in fulfilling
Monsanto’s sustainability vision.
Shapiro established seven strategic teams to explore
sustainability issues and their implications for the
company’s future business, including the ‘Global
Hunger Team’ which studied ‘how Monsanto might
develop and deliver technologies to alleviate world
hunger’ (Magretta 1997: 86). A ‘Sustainable
Development Business Sector’ was established to
operationalise the sustainability strategy. It included a
‘Smallholder Team’ which was ‘charged with
developing products, services and partnerships to
meet the needs of rural, small-scale farmers in
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developing countries’ (Simanis and Hart 2000: A7).
Monsanto’s agriculture division had already begun to
focus on developing country markets in the early
1990s, towards the goal of ‘transforming agriculture’
in a number of developing countries, a target that
became known as the ‘developing country goal’.
Developing country farmers can thus be seen to have
assumed a central place in Monsanto’s strategy for
market development and competitiveness as well as
Shapiro’s vision of sustainability.
The concerns of developing countries and smallholder
farmers were also among the factors that triggered
the crisis which engulfed Monsanto in 1998 and 1999,
when the company’s plans for the commercialisation
of GM crops ran into problems, especially in Europe
(Simanis and Hart 2000; Charles 2001; Glover 2007).
Both the consumer rejection of GM crops and the
specific controversy over so-called ‘terminator’ sterile
seed technology were linked in part to issues of
international development and global hunger. For
instance, activists and development campaigners raised
the alarm over the possibility that terminator
technology could make Third World farmers
dependent on biotechnology and seed companies (e.g.
Christian Aid 1999). Monsanto’s advertising campaign
provoked an outcry partly because it explicitly asserted
the capacity of biotechnology to ‘feed the world’
(Simanis and Hart 2000; Charles 2001).
While these development controversies helped to
trigger the backlash against biotechnology, the
image of smallholders and developing country
agriculture were also invoked by Monsanto as part of
its strategy for tackling the crisis. There were two
important reasons for this. With Monsanto’s progress
in European markets stalled, developing country
markets took on greater significance; the company
urgently needed to expand the market for its GM
crops internationally. In addition, the images of
smallholder farmers and poor consumers in
developing countries assumed a weighty symbolic
importance in global disputes about the merits and
risks of GM crops.
4.1 The ‘New Monsanto Pledge’
A key part of Monsanto’s response to the crisis
(announced by a new CEO, Hendrick Verfaillie) took
the form of a new corporate code of conduct, the
‘New Monsanto Pledge’, which committed the
company to a ‘new way of doing business’ (see Box 1).
Developing country agriculture and farmers were
expressly invoked in several parts of the Pledge, for
instance in the ‘sharing’ section, which declared
Monsanto’s commitment to ‘bring the knowledge
and advantages of all forms of agriculture to
resource poor farmers in the developing world’,5 and
in one of the sub-clauses beneath the ‘respect’
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Box 1 The New Monsanto Pledge3
The New Monsanto Pledge incorporated the following five major commitments:4
Dialogue. We commit to an ongoing dialogue with all interested parties to understand the issues and
concerns related to this technology.
Transparency. We commit to transparency by making published scientific data and data summaries on
product safety and benefits publicly available and accessible, and we commit to working within the
rigorous science-based regulation as required by appropriate government agencies around the world.
Respect. We commit to respecting the religious, cultural and ethical concerns of people throughout
the world …
Sharing. We commit to bring the knowledge and advantages of all forms of agriculture to resource
poor farmers in the developing world to help improve food security and protect the environment.
Benefits. We commit to work for and deliver benefits for farmers commercially as well as
environmentally.
Source Monsanto (2000).
pledge, in which the company ‘underscor[ed] our
commitment not to pursue technologies that result
in sterile seeds’. Poor farmers were also implicitly
constructed as both potential beneficiaries and
potential customers of Monsanto’s activities in the
‘benefits’ part of the Pledge. Meanwhile, the terms
of the ‘sharing’ pledge clearly endorse Monsanto’s
interest in marketing its products to poor farmers
and expanding the market for its technologies in the
developing world (Monsanto 2000).
Monsanto has openly acknowledged the mixture of
self-interest with other motives underlying its ‘sharing’
commitment and engagement with small farmers:
[S]haring offers us … important business
advantages as well. By participating in
partnerships that introduce new agricultural
products, technologies and training to
developing countries, we are helping farmers
realize tangible economic benefits. As these
farmers become more able to afford the
seeds and products that will maintain their
newfound agricultural productivity, we hope
they will remain our customers.
(Monsanto n.d.: 10)
This extract highlights the central importance which
the company attributed to products, technologies
and training in its interactions with small farmers, as
well as its conviction that new seeds and products
were essential prerequisites for improving and
sustaining ‘productivity’ (a term which is itself loaded
with assumptions about the goals of farmers and
notions of efficiency). This emphasis on the provision
of technology and knowledge is an indication of the
degree to which Monsanto’s engagement with small
farmers was founded on a set of assumptions that
reflected a linear, technology transfer model of
agricultural development. In this implicit model of
innovation, new technologies flowed downstream
from scientists in Monsanto’s laboratories and
greenhouses to farmers, including smallholders, and
consumers. As I discuss below, this orientation was
reflected in the design and implementation of the
Monsanto Smallholder Programme.
5 An overview of the Monsanto Smallholder
Programme
At the same time as he announced the New
Monsanto Pledge, Hendrik Verfaillie announced the
creation of the company’s new Smallholder
Programme. According to company literature, the
SHP provided smallholder farmers with ‘a package of
existing commercial technologies, including improved
seeds, biotechnology traits where approved and
applicable, conservation tillage practices, crop
protection products and other inputs, as well as
training and technical assistance’. The company also
claimed that the SHP provided support for ‘self help
group formation … the creation of other income
generating activities [and] access to microcredit, as
well as linkages to grain traders and processors who
purchase surplus crops’ (Monsanto 2002a).
It would be easy to dismiss the SHP as an exercise in
public relations, and indeed it is true that Monsanto
has used the programme as a source of stories to
present the company’s relations with Southern
farmers in a favourable light. However, the
programme was also motivated by a number of other
factors. In order to understand these, it is important
to recognise the degree to which Monsanto is a
relative newcomer to the seed industry, especially in
developing countries (Glover 2007).
It was only in the late 1990s that Monsanto acquired
interests in a number of international seed
companies, including Cargill’s global seed business
and a stake in the large Indian seed firm, Mahyco.
Although Monsanto had been marketing herbicides
internationally for many years, its entry into the seed
business was a new departure. The SHP in India
should therefore be seen in the context of
Monsanto’s effort to build its market share and
develop its brand presence in order to compete with
its more established rivals. In addition, the company’s
global managers in St Louis were used to dealing
with the conditions of large-scale commercial
farmers, especially in North America, but Monsanto’s
strategic expansion in both seeds and herbicides in
developing countries brought the company into
direct contact with smallholder markets for the first
time. The SHP therefore also served as a mechanism
to help Monsanto’s strategic managers learn how to
engage with the smallholder segment of the market
(Glover 2007).
A good summary of the basic SHP model appeared
in a Monsanto publication, Growing Partnerships for
Food and Health:
[D]emonstration plots and farmer trials enable
smallholder women and men to witness the value
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of technology packages that include improved
seeds, crop protection products, fertilizers and
conservation tillage practices. Training sessions
provide the knowledge they need to use the new
package safely and effectively. Micro-loans help
them get started on their own farms, and market
access assistance helps them sell their surplus crops
to generate income for their families. Farmers
who adopt the new technologies first help expand
the effort by teaching others in their community.
(Monsanto n.d.: 4)6
In 2001, the SHP was reported to encompass 21
projects in 13 countries, reaching more than 320,000
small farmers (Austin and Barrett 2001), although a
company briefing dated January 2002 indicates that
Monsanto was directly involved in just a handful of
smallholder projects, in Mexico, India, Indonesia,
Kenya and South Africa (Monsanto 2002a).7 In India,
the company claimed to be reaching 35,000 farmers
in 415 villages.8 SHP projects were implemented in
the states of West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh,
Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP).
5.1 SHP projects in India
The first SHP project in India was a small-scale pilot
project carried out in three villages of Guntur
District, AP during the kharif9 season of 1999. The
project aimed to promote IPM techniques through
large-scale field demonstrations. Farmers were given
training ‘on adoption of new package of practices
embodied with latest technologies [sic]’ (Sohoni et al.
2000: 46). The package of practices included
‘suitable, appropriate, economical and eco-friendly
technologies such as seed treatment, stem
application, use of pheromone traps, arranging bird
perches, growing trap crops like Castor, Marigold and
Jowar as border crop [sic]’ (Sohoni et al. 2000:46).10
The project employed a number of locally recruited
technical or field assistants, who were young men,
not technically qualified in agriculture but educated
up to tenth class or intermediate level. They were
supervised by two technically qualified extension
officers. A similar structure was employed in a
project on rice in West Bengal in 2000. A variation
on this model appeared in the Humsafar (‘companion
on a (long) journey’) project in Rajasthan, where
demonstration plots or ‘tech farms’ were established
by company staff on land belonging to a local farmer.
The Monsanto Meekosam (‘Monsanto for you’)
project was initiated in Vizianagram District of North
Coastal AP in 2001. The project was initiated with a
survey of local farmers and agricultural practices in
order to identify technology ‘adoption gaps’. The
project organisers then ‘developed a specific package
of practices for five or six specific crops’ that were
deemed to be relevant to the local agricultural
systems, including rice, maize, cotton and some
horticultural crops. The project promoted particular
products and technologies, notably Monsanto’s
hybrid maize seeds and range of herbicides. It also
included some promotional activities for transgenic,
insect-resistant Bt cotton.
The project was managed by the local sales manager
and supervised by a project coordinator, who was a
postgraduate in agriculture. Ten project officers (POs)
who were typically recent graduates in agriculture
were recruited. Each PO was resident in a
substantial village and conducted a programme of
farm visits, product demonstrations and farmer
training meetings in the surrounding area, as well as
responding to farmers’ requests for help. The POs
maintained checklists to record which farmers had
been trained and to track whether they were
applying the recommended package of practices.
6 Farmer participation in the SHP
In many significant respects, the design of the SHP
can be seen to hark back to the T&V style, TOT mode
of agricultural extension. The similarity can be seen,
for example, in the rigidity of the uniform package of
practices and the assignment of officers to cover a
particular catchment area. It is also evident in the use
of locally recruited, minimally trained technical
assistants in the early projects, who relied on the
expertise of more highly trained specialists to deal
with farmers’ technical queries. Later, as in the
Meekosam project, graduates were employed as
project officers, but nevertheless, their activities
were closely supervised and organised around the
delivery of the approved package of practices
through a prescribed schedule of farm visits and
other activities. They still relied on technical officers
to help them handle more difficult or unusual
problems.
Interviews with Meekosam project staff make clear
that they took for granted a set of assumptions
about information and knowledge transfer,
education and training, and the promotion of
standardised technology packages to farmers. For
instance, the sales manager in charge of the
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Meekosam project in Vizianagram told me, ‘Our focus
was … on educating the farmers … They have the
need for education and information … [We were]
passing on the technical information – information
services to the small growers’. In another interview,
he said ‘[Our purpose was] to help small growers on
right cultural practices’. He remarked that the
farmers felt the project was ‘like a school’. In a
similar vein, his counterpart in Warangal District told
me that one of the primary objectives of the
Meekosam project was ‘to give the update of
technical information of agriculture as well as our
products’ and ‘our process [was designed] to keep
the farmer on track’.
The focus on commercial commodity crops – maize,
cotton and rice – resembles what has been labelled
the ‘commodity approach’ to agricultural extension; a
mode which harks back to the colonial era. This focus
on commodity crops is clearly linked to a set of
implicit assumptions about agriculture as a
commercial production activity and to Monsanto’s
aim to promote its major seed and chemical
products. In this respect, it is interesting to note that
the focus of the SHP in India was reoriented away
from rice (in the early West Bengal project) and
towards maize and cotton (in the later Humsafar and
Meekosam projects) around 2000, a decision which
coincided with the global parent company’s strategic
decision to withdraw from the rice sector and
concentrate on maize, soybean, cotton and wheat.
These assumptions about commercial farming as an
implicit goal for agricultural development were
reflected in the way that the SHP was conceptualised
by Monsanto executives. For Monsanto, the adoption
of new technologies and scientifically informed
practices was a central feature of a concept of
development through which farmers would make the
transition from a subsistence mode of farming to a
more commercial agriculture. This technological and
commercial transition was in fact central to their
image of what ‘development’ was all about.
6.1 ‘Development’ as technology transfer and
market transition
The SHP was conceptualised by Monsanto executives
as part of an ‘intermediate’ or ‘transitional’ strand of
the company’s operations that fell between the core
business of the firm on the one hand, and the
company’s philanthropic activities (represented by the
Monsanto Fund) on the other. This ‘three strands’
idea appears to have been current among executives
at different levels within the Monsanto hierarchy.
The concept of the transitional strand carried with it
consciously articulated expectations about helping
farmers to make the leap from one realm to the
other – as one senior SHP executive put it, ‘from the
subsistence to the commercial world’, ‘from
subsistence to market’.
The idea of development implicit in the concept of
the transitional strand is encapsulated in the notion
of farmers making a transition from non-commercial
(perhaps ‘pre-commercial’) subsistence farming to
commercial agriculture. The key event which
demonstrates this transition is the farmers’ adoption
of new technology. According to this conception,
non-adoption or slow adoption of new technology is
seen as a key signifier of underdevelopment, and the
act of technology adoption signifies development
taking place. At the same time, technology adoption
represents the farmers’ transition to a new,
commercial mode of agriculture, in which the
purchase of external inputs is a key feature. Hence, in
this conception, poor farmers assumed a dual
identity as both potential beneficiaries and potential
customers of Monsanto’s technology. But were
smallholders the primary beneficiaries of the SHP
projects?
6.2 Targeting smallholders?
Monsanto’s publications emphasise the company’s
engagement with ‘smallholders’. However, it is not
clear that smallholders, strictly defined, were the
primary target group. The company appeared to
define smallholders as those farming less than 5 ha of
land (12.4 acres) (Monsanto n.d.: 4) – which is not
particularly small; in India, small and marginal farmers
are commonly defined as those cultivating areas
around one acre.11 In fact, however, it is not clear that
the size of a farmer’s landholding or other concrete
indicators were used to select participants for the
smallholder projects. A St Louis-based Monsanto
marketing executive told me ‘I’m not sure we had a
real clean definition’ of smallholders, noting that the
meaning of the concept would vary from place to
place. He preferred to think in terms of a rule of
thumb which took into account the ‘size’ and
‘economics’ of the farm but also, crucially, its ‘long-
term potential’ and the ‘objectives of the farmer’.
This reference to the ‘objectives of the farmer’ is a
code for the farmer’s willingness to adopt new
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technologies and manage his or her farm on a
commercial footing. Farmers who were thought to
be most likely to experiment with new technologies
were characterised as ‘leading’ or ‘progressive’
farmers, whereas smallholders were characterised as
‘slow adopters’ of new technology. However, the
underlying issue of the differences among farmers in
terms of their capacities to experiment with
technology – to afford it, in particular – was not
generally acknowledged – although one senior
marketing executive in St Louis did recognise that
the poorest farmers would ‘never’ adopt Monsanto’s
GM crop technologies, ‘because they just can’t afford
the up-front costs’.
In practice, both small and large farmers participated
in SHP projects, but larger and more prosperous
farmers were given special attention. As one
observer of the project in Kumili village pointed out,
the project officials had provided free samples of
Monsanto’s maize hybrids ‘not for the weaker
sections, only for the “gentlemen” of the village …
That way, the gentlemen will explain to the common
man’. The need to prioritise larger and more
prosperous ‘lead farmers’ or key important farmers’,
in the expectation that their example would
influence other farmers in the project villages, was
taken for granted by Monsanto staff, from field-level
project officers to managers in Mumbai and even, to
a lesser extent, senior executives in St Louis – where
senior executives were further from the detail of
field-level operations in India.
This places Monsanto’s claims about the use of
‘farmer-training-farmer’ techniques in the SHP into
a new light, exposing the market orientation of the
programme. Indeed, the emphasis on lead farmers
calls into question the degree to which the SHP
represented a novel departure from agribusiness
companies’ regular market development activities,
which would typically involve much of the same basic
repertoire of farmer meetings, demonstration plots,
engagement with opinion leaders and so on.
In fact, the key difference between the SHP and
regular marketing was not so much in the
techniques used but the market segments targeted.
As Monsanto’s former global manager for
smallholder agriculture observed, the commercial
operations staff ‘were dealing with the low-hanging
fruit; we were dealing more with the second tier’. In
this respect, the SHP projects arguably have a good
claim to additionality, in that they were serving areas
of the market that would not ordinarily have been
reached. For example, the Meekosam project was
first implemented in an area that was widely
regarded as an ‘undeveloped’ market, one that
would not normally have been targeted by sales
operational staff. However, by targeting the larger
farmers in such districts, it has to be doubted
whether the projects were really reaching the lower
levels of the market. As if to illustrate this point, one
apparently prosperous farmer who had participated
in the Guntur pilot project told me that the project
had not made much difference to him individually,
since he had always been able to access the inputs
he needed from his local distributor, on credit, both
before and after the project.
Some effort was made to reach small farmers and
disadvantaged groups. For the Meekosam project, the
national SHP manager and local sales manager
sought to enter into a partnership with the AP
Government’s high-profile Development of Women
and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) programme. In
fact, Vizianagram and Rangareddy Districts were
selected for the project after consultation with
officials from DWCRA and an agronomist with the
DWCRA programme toured Vizianagram District
alongside the local sales manager to help him
identify villages in which to station the POs.
One non-governmental organisation (NGO) staff
member cast doubt on Monsanto’s motives for trying
to link up with DWCRA: ‘Everybody goes to them,
because they’re terribly well-organised’. She noted
that an association with the DWCRA programme
gives firms access to its large network of established
women’s groups, which helps them to access villages
and farmers, as well as benefit from the credibility
and assurance that comes from being able to
represent themselves as partners in a widely known
and respected government programme.
Some training events did occur with DWCRA
women’s groups in Vizianagram District. However,
the public–private collaboration did not take off.
Monsanto staff complained that they did not have
the enthusiastic support of the local DWCRA
officials and decided to proceed without their
support. However, according to one of the
Meekosam POs, participation by local DWCRA
women’s groups was patchy, which he attributed to
the women’s perception that the Meekosam project
Glover Farmer Participation in Private Sector Agricultural Extension68
did not have official backing and did not offer them
any material support, only advice. (This comment is
particularly interesting in the light of the fact that
samples clearly were given to so-called lead farmers.)
In certain respects, the SHP can be seen to have been
a novel initiative that was in some degree responsive
to the needs of farmers. A key factor was the
assignment of project officers to live in villages. This
meant that they were available on the spot to deal
with questions and problems brought to them by
farmers. According to one farmer who lived close to
the Meekosam project office in Kumili village, a queue
of farmers would form outside the office every
morning. POs reported that they spent a significant
proportion of their time responding to the farmers’
requests for help and advice.
The fact that the POs were resident as guests in the
village, combined with their professional
responsibility to promote the Monsanto brand as a
dependable and approachable source of technical
expertise, placed them under a strong obligation to
help the farmers resolve all kinds of agronomic
problems, even where that didn’t involve an
opportunity to promote Monsanto’s own products.
Indeed, at least in the early phase of the SHP, senior
managers strongly emphasised that the programme
was not intended primarily to promote Monsanto
products; one senior SHP manager related how staff
were told ‘“Don’t link it with commercial
[operations]”’ and ‘not a single word was uttered on
Monsanto products’.
To some degree, therefore, the farmers were able to
exercise an immediate kind of influence over the
content and delivery of the programme, and a face-
to-face form of accountability. Indeed, farmers in
Vizianagram District credited Monsanto with offering
them services which no other agency was providing.
They held the Meekosam POs in high esteem and
expressed gratitude for the work they did. So what
was the role of farmers in the SHP?
6.3 The appearance of farmers
The Monsanto managers’ descriptions of the SHP as
an information and training programme, to ‘educate
the farmers’ and ‘keep them on track’, depicted small
farmers as uninformed, slow to adopt new practices
and technologies, in need of education to improve
their farming methods and wayward in their failure
to adhere to the practices they were taught unless
they were closely supervised. In this implicit
conception, the small farmers appear as rather
passive recipients of new knowledge. In fact, the
farmers themselves asserted that they were willing
to experiment with new technologies to see if they
lived up to the promised benefits.
For example, one farmer in Karlapudi village, Guntur,
announced, ‘Whatever’s new, I’ll go for it – seeds,
pesticides, whatever’. But he was equally willing to
abandon the new practices if they did not work or
he found them unsuitable. He related how the
project officers had strongly encouraged farmers to
adopt new pest control techniques, namely stem
application of pesticides and the planting of castor
and marigold as ‘trap crops’. Although he had tried
the techniques during the project, he abandoned
them immediately afterwards because they were
labour-intensive and explained, ‘We’re already used
to spraying … Labour is also a problem here – that’s
why we’re not going for trap crops’. The same
farmer smiled as he acknowledged that he and his
neighbours had effectively ignored the advice they
were given: ‘That particular year they were very
particular about not using pesticides indiscriminately
[but] once the project was over, we reverted to the
normal [indiscriminate] spraying’.
One of his neighbours said that he had abandoned
the recommended practices because he felt they did
not work well enough: ‘For the first one hundred
days, we followed their advice but the pest was not
under control … We adopted our own methods
after that’. When I asked whether he had continued
with the use of trap crops as part of his pest
management system, he replied: ‘No. If we plant
marigolds, it attracts porcupines, and that destroys
our crop’. In another village, the farmers abandoned
some of the recommended products and techniques
when the Meekosam project ended, primarily
because support was no longer so readily available on
their doorstep: ‘Earlier, we used to get the samples
here, now we have to go to Vizianagram or
Pusapatirega to get advice’.
These comments help to show the degree to which
the inflexible, expert-defined packages of practices
failed to address the needs and priorities of the
participating farmers in a coherent and sustainable
way. There were no meaningful opportunities for
farmers to express their views, determine the
priorities of the projects or contribute to the design
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of the technology packages. When the new
practices were found to be unsuitable, farmers were
able to exercise their choice as consumers to reject
or abandon them, but there were no meaningful
channels through which their feedback might have
been used to reshape the projects.
More fundamentally, there were no opportunities for
the farmers to influence Monsanto’s upstream
research and development priorities. Indeed, one
senior executive attested that he did not see much
opportunity for small farmers to help shape the
corporate research and development programme,
because the strategic decision to pursue a particular
crop or trait technology was a ‘high-level’ one, early in
the innovation process, after which there was ‘not
much fine tuning’ to which farmer feedback might
contribute.
Ultimately, one is driven to the conclusion that the
model of agricultural extension embodied in the
SHP was essentially a commercial one, informed by
assumptions based on a consumerist, market-based
model of technology diffusion. Indeed, the focus on
market development was entrenched in the
organisation of the SHP. At all levels of the
programme, the small SHP team depended rather
heavily on the cooperation of their colleagues in
sales and market development to help implement
their projects. Sales and market research data were
used to identify potential areas for SHP projects, and
the final choice of particular villages was influenced
by local sales staff. As one senior SHP executive put
it, ‘We were guided by our marketers [to areas]
where they thought we could contribute the most’.
Sales staff were also directly involved with the day-
to-day management and supervision of SHP
projects.
Over time, the influence of sales and market
development imperatives had a strong influence on
the content and implementation of the programme.
SHP staff found that they had to continually explain
and ‘sell’ the programme to operational colleagues,
who were sometimes sceptical or even hostile. They
increasingly did so by justifying the programme as a
means of developing experimental ‘models’ for
future marketing efforts to the smallholder sector.
Over time, this undoubtedly shaped perceptions of
what the programme was for. As a result, as time
passed, business imperatives came to dominate over
the more philanthropic goals of the programme.
Meekosam field workers related how the pressure to
focus on boosting sales gradually increased during the
life of the project. This shift in emphasis was
particularly marked in the second season of the
project (kharif 2002), when the project expanded to
Warangal District. There, the local sales manager
clearly regarded the project unequivocally as a vehicle
for market development and sales growth. He told me
‘it is not a social organisation’ and explicitly contrasted
his approach with the one taken by his counterpart in
Vizianagram: ‘[He] took DWCRA [women’s groups] as
key; I took the potential areas [i.e. areas with market
development potential] as key’. The emphasis on
commercial goals ultimately undermines the perceived
rationale for a special programme targeted towards
smallholders, and helps to explain the premature
termination of the programme in 2002 (Glover 2007).
7 Conclusions
The Monsanto Smallholder Programme can be seen
to have evoked outmoded and largely discredited
approaches to agricultural research and extension,
closely resembling the T&V system. The programme
was designed and implemented in a top-down,
expert-driven mode which aimed to facilitate a one-
way transfer of technology from Monsanto’s
laboratory scientists and plant breeders to farmers.
The company drew on the ‘expertise’ of scientists to
design a standard package of practices for each focus
crop, constructed around the adoption of particular
technologies, assumed to be universally applicable
and intended to be delivered in a uniform manner
across a given territory. The selection of focus crops
themselves was determined primarily by the
products and technologies Monsanto had to offer
and wished to promote, and the selection of districts
and villages in which to implement projects was
shaped by the market development priorities
identified by sales managers.
The need for farmers to adopt new technologies and
commercial approaches to farming were regarded as
axiomatic steps in the process of ‘development’, so
that, instead of designing the SHP projects in
response to or with input from the farmers
themselves, their role in Monsanto’s implicit vision of
development was essentially a passive one: to be
consumers of the company’s know-how and
technological products, and to take their place in
Monsanto’s scheme for sustainable agriculture in the
twenty-first century – the vision of ‘transforming
agriculture in developing countries.
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Part of the reason for this is that Monsanto needed
to generate favourable associations between GM
technology and small farmers. Smallholders had
assumed a particular symbolic importance in global
arguments about transgenic crops. Monsanto has
sought to document and publicise its work with
‘smallholders’ to a wide audience, through a series of
‘Pledge reports’ and other publications, and several
websites (Monsanto 2001, 2002a,b,c, 2004, 2005,
n.d.).12 Rhetorically, the new Monsanto Pledge sought
to establish resource-poor farmers and consumers in
the developing world as the legitimate arbiters of
whether GM crops should be judged a desirable and
beneficial technology. Seen in this light, the New
Monsanto Pledge and the Smallholder Programme
appear as key elements of a strategy to influence
global public and policy debates about biotechnology
in agriculture and development.
By highlighting positive stories about the benefits of
GM technology for smallholders, Monsanto clearly
hopes to influence the global debate about GM
crops, and in particular to demonstrate or even
‘prove’ to the wider world the value and
appropriateness of transgenic crops for developing
countries. Against this background, the Smallholder
Programme can be seen to have had a role to play in
winning the argument for agricultural biotechnology
at the global level. In order for this argument to be
made, it was necessary to make certain prior
assumptions about the needs and priorities of
farmers, rather than depend on them articulating
their own preferences and priorities, which might
conflict with the company’s interests in marketing a
particular basket of technologies and practices. It
represented a holding steady of the farmers as a
constituency, which relied upon key assumptions
about their interests, rather than consulting them.
In some respects, the SHP represents an
encouraging, innovative experiment in which, for a
few years, a major transnational company devoted
significant resources to serving the neglected,
smallholder segment of the market. However, partly
because of the approach they took and partly because
of the competing commercial priorities, the model
was not really organised around the needs and
priorities of farmers. As a result its benefits, such as
they were, were short-lived, either because of the
withdrawal of institutional support or because the
technologies and practices promoted through the
SHP were found wanting in some respect. Whereas
Monsanto’s staff regarded the adoption of the new
methods and practices as a one-time, one-directional
developmental step that would transform farmers’
behaviour into the future, farmers themselves were
willing to experiment with new techniques but were
happy to abandon them and go back to their previous
practices if, for whatever reason, they found them
undesirable, for example ineffective, inconvenient or
expensive. To that extent, they can be seen to have
exercised voice as consumers in the marketplace, but
a greater opportunity to design a programme around
their expressed needs and priorities was lost.
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Notes
* I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and
the research assistance of Mr Kiran Sakkhari in
carrying out the research on which this article is
based. I am also grateful for the helpful comments
of the three editors, Ian Scoones, Peter Newell and
participants in the conference session on which this
article is based. The interviews cited in this article
were conducted during field visits to India and the
USA between October 2004 and December 2005.
1 See www.mahindra.com/mahindras/
FARM_EQUIPMENt/mssl/mssl.htm#MSSL
(accessed 19 May 2006).
2 See www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/
citizenconsumers/index.html (accessed 19 May 2006).
3 Nowadays known simply as ‘The Monsanto
Pledge’. It was originally labelled ‘new’ at the
time when the company’s management was
seeking to establish the ‘new Monsanto’ as a
specialised agricultural business, distinct from the
‘old’ Monsanto company as it had existed prior to
its merger with Pharmacia and Upjohn to form
the Pharmacia Corporation in 1999. The word
‘new’ also recognised the fact that the document
emerged from an original Monsanto Pledge,
adopted in 1990, which was ‘a statement of
environmental responsibility’ (Monsanto 2000).
4 Subsidiary commitments were included, which
elaborated on the five headline pledges.
5 Later versions of this pledge more explicitly
underpinned the company’s ‘technology
cooperation’ agreements – as opposed to the
smallholder projects – through which it licensed
its proprietary technologies for non-commercial
exploitation in the developing world (Monsanto 2001).
6 The document itself is undated. However, two
inserts, tucked into a pocket in the flyleaf at the
back of the document, are dated January 2002.
The packet was given to the author by a
Monsanto executive in St Louis in May 2002.
7 According to the same document, Monsanto was
indirectly involved in projects in a larger number
of countries, through its support for projects
implemented by Winrock International in ‘West
Africa and Indonesia’ and by Sasakawa Global
2000 in ‘Ghana, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Malawi and
Mozambique’. A former ‘Global Lead, Smallholder
Agriculture’ described this arrangement as ‘more
like aid’ (Interview, former Monsanto executive,
USA, 29 June 2005).
8 See www.monsantoindia.com/monsantoin/
humsafar/humsafar2.html (accessed 21 May 2004).
9 Summer or monsoon season.
10 ‘Seed treatment’ refers to the application of
chemical pesticides to seeds before planting.
‘Stem application’ refers to a technique for
applying pesticides to the stems of growing
plants, rather than spraying the chemical over the
plant. The technique is credited with being highly
economical in comparison with conventional
spraying methods (Sohoni et al. 2000).
11 From St Louis, of course, almost all Indian farmers
would be considered very small.
12 Monsanto’s Pledge website has a section on the
socioeconomic impacts of GM crops,
www.monsanto.com/monsanto/layout/our_pledge/
socioeconomic (accessed 23 February 2006),
which complements special websites that
promote biotechnology, such as the Biotech
Knowledge Center, www.biotechknowledge.
monsanto.com (accessed 6 September 2006) and
‘Conversations about Biotechnology’,
www.monsanto.com/biotech-gmo/index.htm
(accessed 6 September 2006). In 2000, Monsanto
launched a specific programme to encourage and
facilitate, directly and indirectly, research by
independent academics into the economic and
social impacts of GM, insect-resistant Bt cotton
(Monsanto 2001).
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